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1. Introduction 
Embezzlement is one of the many forms of corruption besides bribing and extortion. It 
corresponds to an intentional dishonest act, committed by individuals who misappropriate assets 
that were entrusted to them in order to monopolize or to steal them.1 Press releases regularly 
illustrate embezzlement by politicians, artists, or even ecclesiastics.2 Embezzlement is a 
worldwide scourge that is particularly worrying in developing countries because it generates 
inefficiency and unfairness (Bardhan, 1997; Fantaye, 2004; Fan et al., 2010; Olken and Pande, 
2011).3 In 2013, the African Development Bank reported that during a 30-year time span 
embezzlement represents about US$1.2 trillion in real terms. It is a particularly severe concern 
for charitable giving and international aid. Indeed, senders need to rely on intermediaries to 
distribute funds to recipients or to undertake development programs. This creates a favorable 
context for embezzlement because beneficiaries usually ignore the amount of the initial 
donations and the senders cannot verify the amounts that eventually go to the beneficiaries.4 This 
raises an issue both for transparency and for the organization of the transfer chain.  
Despite its importance, embezzlement has received little attention in economics compared 
to the large literature on bribing (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Abbink 
et al., 2002; Bertrand et al., 2007; Olken, 2007; Cameron et al., 2009; Barr and Serra, 2010; 
Vicente, 2010; Armantier and Boly, 2011, 2012; Abbink and Serra, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2012; 
                                                          
1 Embezzlement can use several techniques such as falsification of records, emission of false bills, declaration of 
ghost employees or stealing money in cash. In political science, Green (1993) defines embezzlement as a “theft-
after-trust offense”. 
2 Lady Gaga was sued over US$5 millions for the proceeds of the sales of her charity bracelet "We Pray for Japan" 
to help the 2011 Tsunami victims. Not all of the proceeds went to Japan according to the legal network 1-800-LAW-
FIRM (Washington Post). In 2014, Cardinal Bertone, former Secretary of State of Vatican, was suspected of 
embezzlement for over 15 million Euros from Vatican accounts. 
3 For instance, under the reign of Mubutu (DR Congo) theft of overseas aid money or resource rents was estimated 
over US$ 4 billion. US$1.8 million given to Sierra Leone by the Department for International Development to 
support peacekeeping disappeared. Uganda spent 20% of its public expenditures on education in the mid 90s but 
schools received only 13% of the government spending on the program; 20% of teachers’ salaries in 1993 paid to 
ghosts (Reinikka and Svenson, 2004). After the 2010 earthquake the charity Yele Haiti gathered over US$16 million 
in donations, but less than 1/3 was distributed to emergency relief for Haitians.  
4 It should be noted, however, that in recent years donors can find more easily information about charities' efficiency 
thanks to on-line providers of comparative information such as Charity Navigator or Charity Watch.  
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Serra and Wantchekon, 2012; Banuri and Eckel, 2015; Gneezy et al., 2015; Sequeira, 2016). 
Although both forms of corruption can be represented by a sequential three (or more)-player 
game, a major difference is that bribing always involves joint dishonesty between several 
players, which is not necessarily the case with embezzlement.  
In this paper we study the embezzlement of senders’ donations by intermediaries and its 
consequences on senders' behavior and recipients' welfare. We rely on a behavioral model and 
an experiment to address two key issues: (i) to what extent does transparency on senders’ 
generosity for recipients reduce embezzlement, and (ii) how is embezzlement influenced by the 
structure of the transfer chain between senders and beneficiaries. We also investigate whether 
the impact of transparency is conditional on the length of the transfer chain. Indeed, adding more 
links increases both the number of intermediaries in a position to steal and the opportunity to 
dismiss suspicions of fraud onto other links. Thus, increasing transparency may not be so 
effective in longer transfer chains. 
Our contribution is threefold. First, we contribute to the vast literature on dishonesty 
(Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Abeler et al., 2014; 
Irlenbusch and Villeval, 2015) by complementing the rare previous studies on intermediaries’ 
dishonesty and its consequences on receivers or donors.5 Comparing charitable giving with and 
without intermediaries using a within-subject design, Chlaß et al. (2015) found that most senders 
are either price-oriented (i.e., they donate less in the presence of intermediaries because 
embezzlement raises the implicit price of giving) or donation-oriented (i.e., they donate the same 
amount with intermediaries than without), rather than outcome-oriented (i.e., they increase their 
donation to compensate for expected embezzlement). Beekman et al. (2014) found that when 
                                                          
5 The presence of intermediaries is usually associated to increased corruption. Drugov et al. (2014) show that by 
facilitating the relationship between a briber and a bribee, intermediaries intensify corruption by lowering its moral 
cost (see also Hasker and Okten, 2008). On the other hand, modeling embezzlement as a substitute for efficiency 
wages, Fan et al. (2010) sustain that tolerating embezzlement helps better fight bribery. 
 
4 
local chiefs embezzle more resources, villagers are less likely to contribute to local public goods. 
Although we also consider the impact of embezzlement on senders’ generosity and on recipients’ 
welfare, our main contribution lies in the analysis of intermediaries’ behavior.6  
 Second, we contribute to the analysis of policy interventions on embezzlement. In an 
experimental study on service delivery in Ethiopia, Barr et al. (2009) found less embezzlement 
when the wages of intermediaries or the monitoring probability were higher, and when monitors 
were elected rather than randomly selected. We consider alternative interventions, such as a 
shortening of the transfer chain.7 We also contribute to the expanding (and mixed) literature on 
the relationship between transparency and the performance of institutions (Azfar and Nelson, 
2007; Olken, 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Reinnika and Svenson, 2004, 2011) by exploring 
whether the impact of  more transparent information on donations for recipients depends on the 
organization of the transfer chain. Olken (2006) show the importance of local monitoring but 
Platteau (2004) and Abbink and Ellmann (2010) find that observability may not deter 
embezzlement if intermediaries can select the beneficiaries of aid, as potential beneficiaries may 
withhold complaints against dishonest intermediaries to avoid the risk of not being selected. We 
remove this effect, as here intermediaries cannot choose among recipients.  
Third, we contribute to the literature on how pro-social preferences are shaped by 
uncertainty in dictator games. Uncertainty is usually considered either on the side of the sender 
(Dana et al., 2007; Winschel and Zahn, 2014) or on the side of the receiver (Rapoport and 
Sundali, 1996; Huck, 1999; Güth et al., 1996). Introducing intermediaries and manipulating 
information allow us to consider the impact of uncertainty on both sides in the same study.  
                                                          
6 Banerjee et al. (2015) also propose a game of embezzlement but their game is based on misreporting and they 
study whether embezzlement is higher for public sector aspirants than private sector applicants. 
7 Makowski and Wang (2015) observe that the embezzlement rate increases in the number of layers in the structure 
of transfers; in contrast to us, however, they use a common pool resource game in which withdrawals may not be 
characterized as a dishonest action. 
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To address our questions, we have designed and conducted an experiment based on a 
Baseline treatment and a 2x2 factorial design. Our baseline treatment is a standard dictator game. 
Our remaining treatments are based on an embezzlement game that consists of a modified 
sequential dictator game with intermediaries. The dictator is a well-endowed sender, A, who can 
make a transfer to a poorly endowed recipient, C. Except in our Baseline, the transfer cannot be 
carried out directly but requires passing through intermediaries, B.8  Along one dimension, we 
vary the number of intermediaries (0, 1 or 2) in different between-subject treatments to 
investigate how the presence and the number of intermediaries affect both the senders' donations 
and the amounts actually received by the recipients. Along the other dimension, we manipulate 
information in a way that allows the recipient to know the amount of the donation and therefore 
to learn the amount that has been embezzled by intermediaries. We introduce therefore a minimal 
notion of transparency. Although there is no risk of monetary sanction, on may reasonably argue 
that transparency may nevertheless lower embezzlement if it increases the intermediaries’ moral 
cost of stealing by making embezzlement visible to the recipient, which may induce a feeling of 
shame.  
Our experiment was conducted with students in two university campuses located in Dar-es-
Salaam and Manzimbu in Tanzania. Tanzania is a prime area to study embezzlement. It ranks 
119 out of 175 countries in the corruption perception index and it scores 31 out of 100 (from 0 
for very corrupted to 100 for very clean) (Transparency International, 2014).9 By involving 
                                                          
8 Surprisingly, compared to the standard dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et al., 1994) one can find 
very few sequential dictator games in the literature. For example, in Bahr and Requate (2007) a player A divides a 
pie between himself and a player B who can then divide the rest with player C. Our game is different: player A 
decides on how to share his endowment with player C, while the role of player B is to transfer this amount from A 
to C. While formally B is in the position to share the amount received between him and the next player, it is made 
clear in the instructions that A wants B to transfer his donation to C.  
9 Many examples of embezzlement can be found in the country. To cite a recent one, an Ernst and Young’s report 
mentions that in 2013 US$1.3 million disappeared from a Norwegian funded WWF project, “Strengthening 
Capacity of Environmental Civil Society Organizations”. For an analysis of corruption scandals in Tanzania, see 
Gray (2015). 
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subjects from a country in which embezzlement is pervasive, we expect to observe 
embezzlement, such that we can study the efficacy of our treatment manipulations. 
We confront our data to the predictions delivered by a full-fledged behavioral model. The 
key hypothesis is that senders and intermediaries trade off pecuniary gains and moral costs. The 
model introduces a concept of moral ideal for both the senders and the intermediaries. This moral 
ideal constitutes a reference point and deviating from it generates a feeling of loss, assuming 
reference-dependent preferences (e.g., Kahnemann and Tversky 1979, Köszegi and Rabin, 
2006). Although compatible with notions of guilt and guilt from blame (Battigali and 
Dufwenberg, 2007), our model focuses on expectations about the next players’ actions and not 
on beliefs about the extent to which the receiver will feel he has been let down by the transfer 
decision. We predict that senders make donations if they care enough about the recipient's 
welfare. The moral cost for deviating from the moral ideal is sensible to the length of the chain 
and to transparency, directly via observation and indirectly via expectations. We predict that 
embezzlement is larger and donations lower in long chains. Transparency should reduce 
embezzlement, because of shaming, and increase donations but it may be less effective in long 
chains since the feeling of shame is diluted. 
Our results show evidence of embezzlement. Overall, the recipients are better off when the 
transfer chain is shorter both because senders are more generous when donations can be made 
more directly and because less intermediaries are in a position to embezzle (mechanical effect). 
Interestingly, however, at the individual level the mean percentage of the donation that is 
embezzled by an intermediary is lower in long chains than in short chains. Indeed, the first 
intermediaries in long chains embezzle a lower percentage than intermediaries in short chains. 
The second intermediaries embezzle the same percentage than intermediaries in short chains but 
this applies to smaller amounts because they are further down in the chain. This indicates that 
although they keep part of the donation for themselves, intermediaries care about the welfare of 
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the recipients. The direct effect of transparency is to reduce embezzlement by making dishonesty 
observable but this effect can be seen only on intermediaries in short chains and on the second 
intermediaries in long chains. In contrast, the first intermediaries embezzle slightly more under 
transparency. A possible reason is that the direct effect of transparency is compensated by an 
indirect effect in the opposite direction; this indirect effect results from the expectation of less 
embezzlement further down in the chain, which should improve the recipient’s welfare. These 
findings show that introducing more transparency does not necessarily increase the safety of 
transfers – at least in the absence of sanctioning institutions- and that the organization of the 
transfer chain should be taken into consideration. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental 
strategy. Section 3 presents our behavioral model of embezzlement. Section 4 analyzes the 
results. Section 5 discusses these results and concludes. 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
2.1. Experimental design 
Our experiment consists of a baseline condition using a dictator game without intermediary and 
a 2x2 factorial design in which we manipulate both the number of intermediaries and 
transparency. Each treatment is identified as #-INT-T, where # is the number of intermediaries 
(0, 1 or 2) and T (I or NI) accounts for transparency of information. All treatments implement a 
one-shot zero-sum game, using a between-subject design. Let us describe first the Baseline. 
The Baseline treatment (0-Int treatment, hereafter) is a dictator game involving a sender and 
a receiver, designated as “person A” and “person C” in the instructions (see Appendix 1). The 
sender receives an endowment of 15000 Tanzanian Shillings (TS), consisting of 15 bills of 
TS1000 each, and the recipient is endowed with TS2000.10 The sender has to decide how many 
                                                          
10 In contrast with the standard dictator game, the receiver gets a positive endowment to avoid null payoffs that 
could exaggerate the amount of transfers and be less realistic. The structure of the game is unaffected by this choice. 
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bills he is willing to transfer to the recipient. Let us call this transfer the “donation” in the rest of 
the paper. The recipient is passive. 
In the four other treatments, we introduce sequentiality in the dictator game by placing either 
one or two intermediaries between the sender and the recipient. Our aim is to test whether the 
length of the transfer chain affects i) the extent of embezzlement at the aggregate and at the 
individual levels, and ii) the amount of the donations. In the instructions the intermediary is 
designated as “person B” and in case of multiple intermediaries as “person B1” or “person B2” 
depending on the order in the transfer chain. Each intermediary receives an endowment of 
TS5000 to keep. In the 1-Int-NI treatment, the sender’s donation transits through a single 
intermediary; in the 2-Int-NI treatment, the sender’s donation transits through two consecutive 
intermediaries. This mimics the situation of a sender in a developed country making a donation 
to a beneficiary in a developing country; the donation is collected by an organization that will 
transfer it to a local representative. In our instructions, the intermediaries are told explicitly that 
their role is “to transfer the money to person C” and that they are not allowed to transfer a fraction 
of their own endowment to the recipient. By indicating that the envelope contains the TS “that 
the person A you are matched with wants you to transfer to person C”, it is made clear to the 
subjects that if they do not transfer all the money to the next player they do not respect A’s 
intentions.11 Therefore, while formally B is in the position to share the amount received between 
him and the next player (like a dictator), it is made clear in the instructions that A wants B to 
transfer his donation to C. 
                                                          
11 Our design differs substantially from that of Chlaß et al. (2015) who opted for a non-neutral language (using the 
notions of donor and charitable institution) and who measure embezzlement by the amount charged to the donor in 
administration costs. In their game, the charitable institution chooses how much of the donor’s donation to allocate 
to supplementary administration costs and how much to pass on to the recipient. Their instructions made it therefore 
explicit that the intermediary was entitled to make an allocation decision between himself and the recipient. In our 
instructions, we ask intermediaries to count the money in their two envelopes (see procedures) and decide how much 
they leave in the envelope to transfer. A further difference is that decisions in their game were made simultaneously 
while in our case they were made sequentially.  
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In the 1-Int-NI and 2-Int-NI treatments uncertainty is important, as the sender ignores the 
amount actually received by the recipient, the second intermediary ignores how much the first 
intermediary initially received, and the recipient ignores how much money was initially sent to 
him.12,13 The informational structure of the 1-Int-I and 2-Int-I treatments is similar, for one 
exception: the recipient is now informed about the amount of the sender’s donation and this is 
made common knowledge to all players. Our aim is testing whether making the recipient aware 
of the amount donated by the sender (and thereby about the total amount embezzled) affects i) 
the extent of embezzlement at the aggregate and at the individual levels, and ii) the amounts 
donated. By manipulating both transparency and the length of the transfer chain, we can test 
whether the impact of transparency on embezzlement depends on the length of the transfer chain. 
Note that in none of our treatments intermediaries face a risk of monetary sanction. Therefore, 
all the expected effects can only be driven by internalized moral considerations. 
In the final part of the experiment, a questionnaire elicits risk and time preferences.14 
Payment for answering this questionnaire was conditional on tossing a coin in private, like in 
Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) or Abeler et al. (2014). Subjects were instructed to toss the coin 
that was put on their table as many times as they wanted but they were asked to report only the 
outcome of the first toss. Reporting head paid TS2000, reporting tail paid nothing. This task 
gives us a simple measure of dishonesty in our subject-pool when social preferences do not come 
into play (in contrast to the game where money is taken from another participant). 
                                                          
12 We do not to let the second intermediary learn about the first intermediary’s decision to avoid any peer effect in 
the design. Studying peer effects in transfer chains would be interesting in itself but we leave it for further research. 
In addition, in real settings it is not unlikely that intermediaries cannot observe the behavior of other intermediaries 
acting before them. 
13 We also decided not to elicit beliefs during the experiments to avoid both hedging problems and focusing the 
subjects’ attention on potential stealing. 
14 Like Dohmen et al. (2011), subjects were asked: “Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take risks 
or do you try to avoid taking risks?”. Following Visher et al. (2013), they were also asked: “Are you generally an 
impatient person, or someone who always shows great patience?”. They had to report how they see themselves on 
a scale graduated from 0 to 10 from trying to avoid taking risks (or being very impatient) to being fully prepared 
to take risks (or being very patient). 
 
10 
 
2.2. Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in Tanzania on the campuses of the University of Dar-es-Salaam 
and Sokoine University of Agriculture in Mazimbu. These are the two biggest universities in the 
country, providing education on a wide range of subjects (including science, agriculture, 
business, planning). The aim was to diversify the origin of the subjects, one university being 
located in the country’s largest city and the other one in a rural area. The choice of Tanzania was 
motivated by the high rate of corruption in the country. Consistently, our coin task indicates a 
very high cheating rate: 91.02% of the subjects reported heads, which differs significantly from 
50% (binomial test: p<0.001).15 In comparison, the subjects in Abeler et al. (2012) reported a 
percentage of wining outcomes that did not differ from 50%. This indicates that the norm of 
honesty is low in our pool of subjects. 
1080 students were recruited (540 on each campus) via announcements on the bulletin board 
system and in teaching buildings. Each of ten sessions involved between 90 and 120 subjects, 
depending on the treatment. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sessions and the 
subjects’ main characteristics. The null hypothesis of equal characteristics across locations is 
rejected for several variables. It is thus crucial to control for these variables in our analysis.  
Table 1. Comparison of the two subject pools 
Location Dar-es-Salaam Mazimbu Total 
Characteristics of sessions 
Treatments 
0-Int 
1-Int-NI 
1-Int-I 
2-Int-NI 
2-Int-I 
Total 
 
Nb subjects 
100 
90 
90 
120 
120 
540 
 
Nb subjects 
100 
90 
90 
120 
120 
540 
 
Nb subjects (Nb groups) 
200 (100) 
180 (60) 
180 (60) 
240 (60) 
240 (60) 
1080 (340) 
Characteristics of subjects 
Male 
 
65.65% 
 
75.55% 
p-values 
<0.001a 
                                                          
15 Reports could have been affected by the outcome of the previous game. However, if the intermediaries report 
significantly more frequently head than the senders (proportion test: p=0.093), no other pairwise comparison 
indicates significant differences. Since we cannot observe honesty at the individual level, we do not include this 
variable in the regression analysis. 
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Age 
Married 
Christian 
Muslim 
Religious practice (1 to 5) 
Low family wealth  
Patience (from 0 to 10) 
Risk lover (from 0 to 10) 
22.27 (2.37) 
4.27% 
83.15% 
15% 
4.09 (1.05) 
15.93% 
7.88 (2.88) 
7.24 (3.34) 
22.89 (3.21) 
8.16% 
83.30% 
15.40% 
4.15 (1.03) 
27.59% 
7.99 (3.03) 
7.66 (3.30) 
0.003 b 
0.001 a 
0.946 a 
0.855 a 
0.416 b 
<0.001 b 
0.059 b 
0.006 b 
Note: a indicates proportion tests and b Mann-Whitney tests in which one subject gives one independent observation. 
Religious practice is coded 1 for “never pray”, 2 for “pray rarely”, 3 for “pray every week”, 4 for “pray once per 
day”, and 5 for “pray several times per day”. Family wealth is assessed through the answer to the question: “If you 
compare your family’s economic conditions to the others in your hometown, your family is: very poor / poor / 
average / rich / very rich.” “Low family wealth” is equal to 1 if the response is “very poor” and “poor” and 0 
otherwise. 
Upon arrival, subjects were seated in a large aula and received the instructions for all roles 
in both Swahili and English. This assured that all the details about roles and payoffs were 
common knowledge. The instructions were read aloud and questions were answered in private. 
Then, subjects were split randomly into 2, 3 or 4 separate and non-contiguous rooms, depending 
on the treatment, with each room corresponding to a different role. We instructed subjects not to 
talk with anyone while proceeding to their room and this was strictly enforced. In the room, 
several seats isolated each subject from his neighbors in order to avoid communication and 
scrutiny (see Appendix 2). Once all the subjects were seated, they discovered which role was 
assigned to the subjects. Then, they were given some time to read again the instructions. Each 
subject received a random group identification number matching each person A with a person C 
and, according to the treatment, zero, one or two persons B. 
To avoid scrutiny, we used opaque bags to transfer the money and for the subjects to make 
their decision secretly (see Appendix 2). Each sender received a bag containing two envelopes: 
a white envelope containing 15 bills of TS1000 and a brown envelope that was empty. The brown 
envelope could be used to send money to the recipient and it had to be kept in the bag. The 
senders had to decide how many bills to move from the white to the brown envelope. Subjects 
were instructed to make their transfer –if any- within the bag so that their decision could not be 
observed by anyone. Then, assistants collected the bags and brought them to a separate room 
where the content of the brown envelope was recorded under the supervision of the 
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experimentalist. Then, assistants distributed the bags containing the brown envelope to the 
recipients in treatment 0-Int or to each matching intermediary in the other treatments, after 
adding a white envelope containing the endowment of the next player (five bills for an 
intermediary or two bills for the recipient). The intermediaries were instructed to count the 
content of their white and their brown envelopes within the bag and to take out the white 
envelope for them to keep. At this precise moment, they had an opportunity to move bills from 
the brown envelope containing the donation to their white envelope. They were also told that 
they could not put their own bills in the brown envelope. A similar procedure was implemented 
in the case of two intermediaries. Finally, after assistants had collected the bags, the content of 
the brown envelopes was again recorded in a separate room.16 After adding a new white envelope 
to the brown envelope, the bags were brought to the recipients’ room.  
Once the bags were collected, we administered the final questionnaire. In contrast to the 
other players, the recipients filled out their questionnaire before receiving their bag since they 
had nothing to do than wait for others’ decisions. Then, subjects had to report the toss of the coin 
to determine additional payment. We were careful to dismiss the subjects in the different rooms 
at different moments so that they could not meet each other. The experiment lasted about 1.5 
hour. Earnings averaged at TS11330.17 
3. A behavioral model of embezzlement 
We first introduce the framework of the model before stating the role of moral ideal and beliefs. 
Then, we examine the impact of both information transparency and the number of intermediaries 
on donations and embezzlement. Finally, we summarize our predictions. 
 
                                                          
16 We did not use a double blind procedure; thus, subjects may have anticipated that their decision was recorded. 
Note that we are not interested in making point predictions about the extent of embezzlement in real settings. We 
are interested in studying treatment effects.  
17 In Tanzania, the average wage in the private sector is TS78000 per month - about US$45. 
 
13 
 
3.1. The framework 
We model the embezzlement context as a modified sequential dictator game. The game 
consists in a sender (player 0) and a population of n intermediaries (player 1 to player n) who 
decide, sequentially, to transfer a fraction of the amount received from the previous player, to 
the following player in the chain. The amount received by player i is denoted by 𝑟𝑖, normalizing 
the amount initially received by the sender to 𝑟0 = 1. At the end of the chain, the amount is 
transferred to a last player, called the recipient. We emphasize that the game is a modified 
sequential dictator game in the sense that the explicit and common information role of the 
intermediaries is to transfer the money received from the sender to the recipient, without adding 
money from his own endowment. Hence, different moral obligations may intervene for senders 
and intermediaries.  
In the game, player i transfers a fraction 𝜎𝑖 ∈ [0,1] of the amount 𝑟𝑖 she receives, and keeps  
for herself the fraction (1 − 𝜎𝑖) which is referred, for all the players but the sender, as her relative 
embezzlement. One observes that the amount 𝑟𝑖 received by player i is such that 𝑟1 = 𝜎0, 𝑟2 =
𝜎0𝜎1 and, more generally, 𝑟𝑖 = ∏ 𝜎𝑗
𝑖−1
𝑗=0 . We also denote by 𝜑𝑖 = ∏ 𝜎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1  the total fraction of 
player i's transfer that really goes to the recipient. Equivalently, (1 − 𝜑𝑖) represents the total 
relative embezzlement of all the players after player i. The total relative embezzlement is 
therefore (1 − 𝜑0), namely the fraction of the sender’s donation embezzled at the end of the 
chain. In the standard dictator game (our Baseline) where there are only two players (the sender 
and the recipient), 𝜑0 = 1. 
Player i knows the amount 𝑟𝑖 she receives (which is private information) and she forms 
beliefs about the total fraction 𝜑𝑖 of the amount she transfers that eventually reaches the recipient. 
We assume that these beliefs can be affected by a parameter θ ∈ {0,1} reflecting transparency in 
the game. We define transparency as a situation where the recipient observes, under common 
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knowledge, the initial donation of the sender. We let θ = 1 under transparency, and θ = 0 
otherwise. Finally, we denote by ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) the total fraction of player i's transfer she expects the 
recipient will receive under θ. 
Under the assumption of standard selfish preferences, a sender keeps the whole amount 
received for herself and therefore intermediaries have no opportunity to embezzle. Our 
behavioral model considers instead that individuals have a moral motivation for giving (sender) 
or transferring (intermediaries). We assume that player i’s utility function has the following 
additive separable form:  
𝑈(𝜎𝑖, 𝑟𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝑢((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) + 𝑓(𝜎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃)                    (*) 
where u represents the player’s material utility and f her social utility. u depends on her 
monetary payoff (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖, or equivalently on the fraction of the money received that she keeps 
for herself. 18 f captures the player’s moral motivation for giving or transferring, depending on 
her role.  
Hypothesis 1. The function u is strictly increasing and concave (𝑢1 > 0 and 𝑢11 < 0). 
 
We then assume that player i is characterized by a moral ideal that constitutes a reference 
point in terms of donation/transfer, denoted ?̂?𝑖. Given θ and ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), the social utility f increases 
with the donation/transfer as long as 𝜎𝑖 ≤ ?̂?𝑖 and is non-increasing beyond. This may be 
interpreted as moral loss aversion when the donation/transfer is lower than the reference point. 
We also assume that f is weakly concave in its first argument. 
Hypothesis 2. There exists ?̂?𝑖  ∈ [0,1] such that 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖,∙,∙) > 0 for all 𝜎𝑖 < ?̂?𝑖, and  𝑓1(𝜎𝑖,∙,∙) ≤ 0 
for all 𝜎𝑖 > ?̂?𝑖. Moreover 𝑓11 ≤ 0. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is compatible with many specifications, most of which have been discussed in 
the literature on social preferences (see Appendix 3). 
                                                          
18 Note that we assume, without loss of generality, that there is no initial endowment for the players other than the 
sender. 
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We emphasize that we model the senders’ and intermediaries’ preferences in a similar 
fashion. Nevertheless, it can be considered that the moral motives of giving or transferring are 
different, respectively, for senders and intermediaries. Indeed, the sender's donation relies on a 
concern for the recipient’s well-being, or on warm-glow from giving. In contrast, the 
intermediary’s decision is more likely grounded, either on the avoidance of the negative moral 
inclination that leads to embezzlement, or on the warm-glow from behaving honestly. Although 
hypotheses 1 and 2 can be reasonably assumed for the preferences of all the players, the social 
utility f can differ between senders and intermediaries. 19  
3.2. Impact of the moral ideal and beliefs 
Assuming utility function (*) and hypotheses 1 and 2, proposition 1 states a preliminary result: 
Proposition 1.  For a player i, there exists a unique donation/transfer denoted 𝜎𝑖
∗ that maximizes 
her preferences, which is not higher than her moral ideal ideal ?̂?𝑖. A necessary and sufficient 
condition to have 𝜎𝑖
∗ strictly greater than zero is that, when 𝜎𝑖 = 0, the marginal utility loss due 
to a diminution of the monetary payoff is more than compensated by the marginal increase in 
the social utility f.  
 
A technical formulation of all propositions (including their proofs), is presented in Appendix 3 
(for proposition 1, see propositions 1a and 1b). 
The result stated by proposition 1 is true regardless of the player’s beliefs about 
embezzlement after her in the chain, and regardless of the information condition. Hence, a player 
who anticipates full embezzlement after her (?̅?𝑖(𝜃) = 0), can nevertheless donate/transfer a 
positive amount of money to compensate the moral loss vis-à-vis the reference point. For the 
sender (the intermediary), this can be observed if she has an intrinsic motivation to give (behave 
honestly), independent of the amount eventually obtained by the recipient.  
We now investigate the impact of the player’s beliefs relative to embezzlement further down 
in the chain on her optimal donation/transfer. On the one hand, embezzlement can reduce the 
                                                          
19 For instance, if stealing is blamed in the society, the reference level of transfer ?̂?𝑖 can be very high (close to 1) for 
an intermediary. On the contrary, it can be low for a sender, the transfer being a pure donation. For a more accurate 
presentation, we could replace 𝑈 by 𝑈𝑖 and 𝑓 by 𝑓𝑖 in the utility expression. 
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motivation to donate/transfer because some money does not reach the recipient, and hence an 
increase in the anticipated embezzlement reduces her optimal donation/transfer. On the other 
hand, a player can be inclined to compensate anticipated embezzlement, in which case, an 
increase in anticipated embezzlement raises her optimal donation/transfer. Thus, the anticipated 
embezzlement may (or not) have an impact on a player’s optimal donation/transfer. 20 This is 
stated as proposition 2. 
Proposition 2.  An increase in the anticipated embezzlement reduces [resp. increases, resp. has 
no impact on] the player’s optimal donation/transfer if and only if 𝑓12 ≥ 0 [resp. 𝑓12 ≤ 0, resp. 
𝑓12 = 0]. 
 
Hence, a player donates/transfers less when she anticipates more embezzlement, if and only 
if the marginal social utility of her donation/transfer (𝑓1) weakly increases in the fraction of her 
transfer that she expects the recipient will receive  (?̅?𝑖(𝜃)).
 21  Proposition 2 is useful to 
understand the effect of transparency and of the number of intermediaries on the player’s 
behavior. 
3.3. Transparency and the number of intermediaries 
Because the recipient cannot be directly hurt by an unobservable embezzlement (he may believe 
that the sender was not generous), the moral cost of embezzling for the intermediaries is lower 
when there is no transparency of information (θ = 0). There is actually a direct and an indirect 
effect of transparency on donations/transfers. The direct effect is that common knowledge of 
observability of donations by the recipient affects the amounts donated/transferred.22  The 
                                                          
20 In a comparable framework, Chlaß et al. (2015) describe the senders according to their reaction to embezzlement, 
on the basis of the following classification: price-oriented, outcome-oriented or donation-oriented. 
21 It is important to distinguish the impact of ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) on the optimal donation/transfer from its impact on utility. We 
can reasonably assume that a player prefers that intermediaries transfer higher fractions to the recipient. One 
immediately observes that the player’s utility increases with the anticipated intermediaries’ transfer if and only if 
𝑓2 > 0. But this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient to imply a modification of the player’s optimal 
donation/transfer. For instance, if the utility function is such that 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝑢((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) + ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), utility 
increases with ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) but the optimal donation/transfer is independent from it. 
22 In the experiment and the treatment with transparency only the total embezzlement, by all the intermediaries, is 
known by the recipient (this is the difference between the amount donated by the sender, which is known, and the 
amount she receives from the last intermediary). Hence, while the sender’s behavior is fully observed under 
transparency, it is fully observable for an intermediary if and only if she is the only intermediary in the chain. 
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indirect effect goes through the impact on player’s beliefs regarding the transfers of 
intermediaries after them in the chain. The indirect effect affects all the intermediaries in the 
chain except the last one who is affected only by the direct effect. Proposition 3 considers the 
direct effect, controlling for the indirect effect. 
Proposition 3.  Assume that transparency has no impact on the anticipated embezzlement. Then 
the optimal donation/transfer of a player weakly increases with transparency if and only if the 
marginal social utility of her donation/transfer also weakly increases with transparency 
(𝑓1(∙,∙ ,0) ≤ 𝑓1(∙,∙ ,1)). 
 
Hence, a sender whose social utility function satisfies the condition of proposition 3 
perceives transparency as a moral incentive to donate. For an intermediary, the same condition 
implies that transparency increases the moral cost of embezzling, as long as transparency does 
not affect his anticipated embezzlement. We now combine the direct and indirect effects of 
transparency. For senders or intermediaries, we assume the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3. A player anticipates that transparency cannot increase embezzlement of all the 
intermediaries after her in the chain (?̅?𝑖(0)  ≤  ?̅?𝑖(1)).  
 
Hypothesis 4. The direct effect of transparency increases in the donation/transfer (𝑓1(∙,∙ ,0) ≤
𝑓1(∙,∙ ,1), as stated in proposition 3).  
 
Under hypotheses 3 and 4 we establish proposition 4, closely related to proposition 2.  
Proposition 4.  a) If 𝑓12 ≥ 0, then transparency unambiguously increases the player’s optimal 
donation/transfer. b) If 𝑓12 < 0, then the impact of transparency on the player’s optimal 
donation/transfer is ambiguous, unless the player is the last intermediary in the chain. In the 
latter case, transparency unambiguously increases the optimal transfer. 
 
Proposition 4 is intuitive. If 𝑓12 ≥ 0, the direct and the indirect effects of transparency both 
go in the same direction. Indeed, the player anticipates that transparency cannot increase 
embezzlement after her in the chain (hypothesis 3). Therefore, if 𝑓12 ≥ 0, the donation/transfer 
increases (proposition 2, in a dual version). This indirect effect combines with the direct effect 
which is also positive by assumption (hypothesis 4). In contrast, if 𝑓12 < 0, the direct and indirect 
effects go into opposite directions.  
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We finally investigate the impact of the number of intermediaries on players' behavior. 
Assume the following hypothesis about beliefs: 
Hypothesis 5. A player anticipates that an increase in the number of intermediaries cannot 
decrease embezzlement after her in the chain.  
 
Proposition 5 is an immediate corollary of proposition 2, because the number of 
intermediaries only plays a role through the anticipated embezzlement. 
Proposition 5.  An increase in the number of intermediaries reduces [resp. increases, resp. has 
no impact on] the optimal donation/transfer if and only if 𝑓12 ≥ 0 [resp. 𝑓12 ≤ 0, resp. 𝑓12 = 0]. 
 
3.4. Predictions 
Based on propositions 1-5, we can now state precise predictions about players’ actions in our 
experiment. We assume that all players are characterized by the utility function (*) which 
satisfies hypotheses 1-5. As established by propositions 2, 4 and 5, the sign of 𝑓12 determines the 
optimal donation/transfer and conditions the impact on players’ behavior of their strategic 
environment (transparency, number of intermediaries, beliefs). We therefore introduce a further 
restriction on players’ behavior, stated as hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 6. 𝑓12 > 0 for senders and 𝑓12 < 0 for intermediaries. 
For a sender, hypothesis 6 means that an increase in anticipated embezzlement reduces her 
optimal donation (see proposition 2): Embezzlement is perceived as the price to pay for donating, 
and therefore any price lowers donations (see Chlaß et al., 2015). For an intermediary, we assume 
the opposite: An increase in anticipated embezzlement after her in the chain increases the moral 
cost of her own embezzlement, and thus increases her transfer. This can be interpreted in terms 
of guilt for example: if the first intermediary anticipates that the receiver expects to receive a 
certain amount and that the next intermediary in the chain will embezzle a fraction of the 
donation, he may limit his own embezzlement to avoid that the receiver feels excessively 
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disappointed. Under hypotheses 1-6, we can derive the following predictions from propositions 
1-5: 
Predictions for the senders’ donations. P1: A sender donates a strictly positive amount to the 
recipient. P2: For a given level of information, the length of the chain decreases the donation. 
P3: For a given number of intermediaries, transparency increases the donation.  
Predictions for intermediaries’ transfers. P4: An intermediary transfers a strictly positive 
amount to the next player. P5: For a given level of information, the length of the chain decreases 
the first intermediary’s embezzlement. P6: For a given number of intermediaries, transparency 
has an ambiguous effect on the first intermediary’s embezzlement, but implies lower 
embezzlement for the last intermediary in the chain.  
 
4. Results 
We start by comparing the recipients’ earnings under the various transfer regimes. We next 
investigate the impact of the number of intermediaries and of transparency first, on donations, 
and second, on embezzlement.    
4.1. Recipients’ earnings  
Our first result is stated as follows: 
Result 1 (Recipients earnings) a) The mean amount actually received by the recipients decreases 
in the number of intermediaries. b) Transparency has no impact on this amount. 
 
Support for Result 1. Table 2 provides summary statistics for each treatment. It notably indicates 
for the recipients the mean amount received, the percentage of the sender’s endowment and the 
percentage of the donation received, and the mean final earnings. Figure 1 complements Table 
2 by displaying the mean amount received by a recipient, by treatment. 
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Figure 1. Mean amount actually received by the recipients, by treatment 
Table 2. Summary statistics  
 0-Int      1-Int-I 1-Int-NI      2-Int-I 2-Int-NI 
Recipients 
Mean amount received 
Mean percentage received from 
the sender’s endowment 
Mean percentage received from 
the donation  
Mean final payoff 
 
3841.67 
25.61 
 
100 
 
5841.67 
 
1550 
10.33 
 
49.45 
 
3550 
 
1516.67 
10.11 
 
37.96 
 
3516.67 
 
700 
4.67 
 
28.23 
 
2700 
 
733.33 
4.89 
 
25.12 
 
2733.33 
Intermediaries 
Mean total amount embezzled  
Mean total percent. embezzled  
  
2925 
50.55 
 
2200 
62.04 
 
1862.74 
71.76 
 
2979.59 
74.88 
- Intermediary 1 
Mean amount embezzled  
Mean percent. embezzled 
Mean final payoff  
 
- 
- 
- 
 
2925 
50.55               
6950 
 
2200 
62.04     
6833.33 
 
1176.47 
44.78 
6000 
 
1326.53 
39.79 
6083.33 
- Intermediary 2 
Mean amount embezzled  
Mean percent. embezzled 
Mean final payoff  
 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
897.44 
52.14 
5583.33 
 
2314.29 
60.69 
6350 
Senders  
Mean amount donated  
Mean percent. donated  
 
3841.67 
25.61 
 
3500 
23.33 
 
3350 
    22.33 
 
2283.33 
15.22 
 
3166.67 
21.11 
Mean final payoff  11158.33 11500 11650 12716.67 11833.33 
Notes: The mean amounts donated include donations equal to 0. The mean amounts embezzled and the percentages 
embezzled are conditional on receiving a positive amount from the previous player. “Mean percent. received from 
the sender’s endowment” corresponds to the amount received*100/15000. “Mean percent. received from the 
donation” corresponds to the amount received*100/amount donated by the sender. “Mean percent. embezzled” 
corresponds to the amount not transferred*100/amount received from the previous player. 
Both Figure 1 and Table 2 indicate that compared to the 0-Int treatment, the presence of a 
single intermediary lowers by 60.09% the mean amount actually received by the recipient. 
Furthermore, introducing a second intermediary decreases this amount by another 53.26% (for a 
total decrease of 81.34% compared to the 0-Int treatment). Mann-Whitney tests (M-W, hereafter) 
indicate that the amount actually received is significantly lower in each treatment with 
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intermediary compared to 0-Int (p<0.001).23 This amount is also significantly lower in 2-Int-NI 
than in 1-Int-NI (M-W: p=0.069) and lower in 2-Int-I than in 1-Int-I (M-W: p=0.049); however, 
the distribution does not differ significantly (K-S: p=0.378 and p=0.182, respectively). In 
contrast, transparency does not affect significantly the amount received (p=0.817 with one 
intermediary and p=0.762 with two intermediaries).  
To provide further support for Result 1, we ran estimates on the amount actually received 
by the recipient. Table 3 reports the marginal effects from four Tobit regressions accounting for 
left-censored data. Standard errors are clustered at the matched group level. In model (1), the 
independent variables include dummy variables for each treatment with 0-Int taken as the 
reference category, and a control for the experimental location. Model (2) is similar to (1), except 
that we control for the amount donated. Models (3) and (4) replicate models (1) and (2), 
respectively, after excluding the dictator game with 1-Int-I as the reference.24  
Table 3. Amount received by the recipient 
 Dependent variable 
                         Absolute amount  received  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0-Int 
1-Int-I treatment 
 
1-Int-NI treatment 
 
2-Int-I treatment 
 
2-Int-NI treatment 
 
Dar-es-Salaam 
 
Amount initially sent  
by the sender 
Ref. 
-1190.692*** 
(171.37) 
-1263.987*** 
(164.43) 
-1594.189*** 
(150.37) 
-1647.304*** 
(151.81) 
-709.426*** 
(162.54) 
- 
Ref. 
-1165.452*** 
(112.06) 
-1136.980*** 
(98.281) 
-1207.739*** 
(100.46) 
-1475.182*** 
(102.75) 
-716.200*** 
(116.69) 
0.370*** 
(0.046) 
 
Ref. 
 
-90.308 
(241) 
-469.703** 
(222.57) 
-538.338** 
(224.49) 
-583.346*** 
(166.47) 
- 
 
Ref. 
 
-4.327 
(178.2) 
-114.336 
(173) 
-400.481** 
(175.2) 
-704.467*** 
(130.28) 
0.217*** 
(0.037) 
Nb of observations 
Left censored observations 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
360 
147 
-2120.459 
360 
147 
-1999.577 
240 
137 
-1069.691 
240 
137 
-1025.626 
Notes:  Table 3 reports marginal effects from Tobit estimates. Robust standard errors are clustered at the matched 
group level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
                                                          
23 In the rest of the section, unless specified otherwise all the non-parametric statistics are based on two-tailed Mann-
Whitney tests in which each subject gives one independent observation. We have also conducted Kolmogorov 
Smirnov tests (K-S, hereafter). Most of the time they deliver the same conclusions as the M-W tests.  
24 We take 1-Int-I as the reference category for the sake of consistency with models (1) and (2) where the reference 
is the baseline dictator game in which, by definition, the donation is visible to the recipient. 
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Model (1) confirms that introducing one intermediary decreases significantly the amount 
received by TS1190.69 with transparency and by TS1263.99 without. Introducing two 
intermediaries decreases this amount by TS1594.19 with transparency, and by TS1647.30 
without. The coefficients of 1-Int-NI and 2-Int-NI differ significantly (p=0.043), as well as the 
coefficients of 1-Int-I and 2-Int-I (p=0.042), confirming that increasing the length of the chain 
has a significant effect. Finally, model (4) indicates that the absence of transparency coupled 
with a longer chain reduces significantly the amount received compared to 1-Int-I. In contrast, 
transparency does not impact the amount received when the chain is short.  
At least three reasons may explain that the amount received decreases in the number of 
intermediaries. First, senders may donate less when the number of potential embezzlers increases 
because it raises the implicit price of giving. Second, a longer chain may imply mechanically 
more embezzlement if each intermediary embezzles. Third, each intermediary may embezzle a 
higher share of the amount received in long chains because he can hide behind the other 
intermediary. In the next sections we explore these potential explanations.  
4.2. Impact of expected embezzlement on senders’ donations 
Our second result summarizes our findings on senders’ behavior: 
 
Result 2 (Senders’ donations) a) Senders donate less in the presence of intermediaries, and their 
donation decreases when the length of the chain increases. b) Unexpectedly, transparency tends 
to reduce donations. 
 
Support for Result 2. Table 2 indicates that in accordance with prediction P1 senders make 
positive donations in all treatments. The senders’ generosity decreases as the number of 
intermediaries increases. While donations represent on average 25.61% of the endowment in 0-
Int, this percentage decreases to 22.83% in the short chain treatments and to 18.17% in the long 
chain treatments. The decrease is significant in the long chain treatments (p<0.001), not in the 
short chain treatments (p=0.123); the difference between the short and the long chain treatments 
does not reach a standard level of significance (p=0.114). These findings suggest that senders 
 
23 
anticipate some embezzlement and react as if the presence of intermediaries increases the 
implicit price of donations.  
The effect of transparency is intriguing. Overall, it is significant neither in the short chain 
treatments (the mean percentage donated is 22.33% in 1-Int-NI and 23.33% in 1-Int-I; p=0.437), 
nor in the long chain treatments (these percentages are 21.11% in 2-Int-NI and 15.22% in 2-Int-
I; p=0.207). However, a visual inspection of the data shows that transparency inflates the share 
of null and minimal donations: in short chains, the share of null donations increases from 16.67% 
to 33% (proportion test: p=0.035) and in long chains the share of TS1000 donations increases 
from 18.33% to 35% (p=0.039). This difference is observed in both experimental locations, 
which rejects the possibility that it is driven by session effects.  
To better understand the determinants of donations, in Table 4 column (1) reports the 
marginal effects of a Tobit model in which the dependent variable is the amount donated. The 
independent variables include dummy variables for each treatment, with 0-Int-NI as the reference 
category, a control for the location and demographic variables (gender, age, marital status, 
religion and religiosity). Then, we report the marginal effects from a two-stage Heckman model 
that allows us to decompose the donation decision into two parts: the decision to donate, 
estimated by a Probit model (column (2)), and the choice of the amount of the donation 
conditionally on donating, estimated with an OLS model (column (3)). In the selection equation, 
the regressors are the same as in model (1). We exclude the Dar-es-Salaam variable from the 
OLS model for identification and we include the Inverse of the Mill’s Ratio calculated from the 
selection equation to identify a potential selection bias. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the matched group level.   
Model (1) confirms the significant negative impact of the presence of intermediaries on 
senders’ generosity in most treatments (1-Int-NI, 2-Int-NI and 2-Int-I). Interestingly, the 
Heckman model reveals that the sender’s binary decision to donate is affected negatively by the 
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presence of one intermediary where there is transparency (1-Int-NI treatment). Conditional on 
the decision to donate, the amount of the donation is affected negatively by the presence of 
intermediaries with respect to the Baseline. But the effect is only significant for the 2-Int-I 
treatment. Altogether these findings confirm that the length of the chain tends to decrease the 
senders’ generosity, in accordance with prediction P2. This is consistent with the idea that 
senders care about the implicit price of donations (as found by Chlaß et al., 2015). 
Table 4. Determinants of the senders’ decisions 
Dependent variables Amount donated 
Tobit  
(1) 
p(donation) 
Probit 
(2) 
Conditional 
amount donated 
OLS (3) 
0-Int-I treatment 
1-Int-I treatment 
 
1-Int-NI treatment 
 
2-Int-I treatment 
 
2-Int-NI treatment 
 
Dar-es-Salaam 
 
Male 
 
Age 
 
Married 
 
Christian 
 
Religious practice 
 
IMR 
Ref. 
-520.815 
(382.06) 
-484.778* 
(294.67) 
-983.440*** 
(245.36) 
-540.882* 
(317.48) 
-38.820 
(231.2) 
193.187 
(245.88) 
53.579 
(65.891) 
285.187 
(509.12) 
-429.253 
(337.23) 
276.947*** 
(107.39) 
- 
Ref. 
-0.306*** 
(0.092) 
-0.121 
(0.080) 
-0.096 
(0.074) 
-0.120 
(0.278) 
-0.083** 
(0.038) 
-0.018 
(0.042) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.082) 
-0.066 
(0.044) 
0.042** 
(0.018) 
- 
Ref. 
-707.052 
(1157.16) 
-1009.127# 
(610.259) 
-2138.499*** 
(504.935) 
-1033.673# 
(671.671) 
- 
 
439.383 
(382.566) 
71.411 
(109.227) 
854.236 
(504.448) 
-806.115 
(510.885) 
587.255 
(246.004) 
4486.815* 
(2480.012) 
Nb of observations 
Left/right censored obs. 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
356 
60/5 
-2864.32 
356 
- 
 -144.431 
297 
Notes: All treatments are included. Table 4 reports marginal effects from Tobit estimates (1) and from a Heckman 
model ((2) and (3)). Robust standard errors are clustered at the matched group level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. # indicates significance at 0.11 level.  
The fact that when there is transparency senders are less willing to donate anything in short 
chains and more willing to donate the smallest possible positive amount in long chains 
contradicts our prediction P3.25 A first possible explanation is that senders who care about the 
                                                          
25 This is intriguing also because Dana et al. (2006) have shown that donors tend to be less generous in the regular 
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amount received by the recipient lower their donation if they expect that transparency reduces 
embezzlement. However, this is inconsistent with the negative reaction of senders to a longer 
chain and with the fact that in short chains with transparency they become more likely to donate 
nothing. A second possibility is that transparency crowds-out the intrinsic motivation of the 
senders who derive a warm glow utility from giving a small amount as long as their donation is 
concealed. However, close inspection of the data shows that transparency reduces the share of 
large donations.26 A third possibility is that the transparency intervention increases the saliency 
of the risk of embezzlement, which may make senders more pessimistic about the future of their 
donation. This remains consistent with our hypothesis that for senders 𝑓12 > 0. 
Finally, Table 3 indicates that a more frequent religious practice increases donations while 
studying in Dar-es-Salaam impacts negatively the probability to donate, suggesting that pro-
social norms are weaker in more individualized urban contexts than in the countryside. 
4.3. Embezzlement by intermediaries  
We first present aggregate results before investigating how intermediaries behave at the 
individual level. 
Result 3. (Intermediaries’ embezzlement, aggregate level) a) A longer transfer chain increases 
the percentage of the donation that is embezzled in total. b) Transparency has a weak negative 
effect on the aggregate level of embezzlement. 
 
Support for Result 3. As indicated in Table 2 and Figure 2, the mean total percentage of the 
amount donated by the senders that is embezzled is higher both when the transfer chain is longer 
and when there is no transparency. Indeed, this percentage is 50.55% in 1-Int-I, 62.04% in 1-Int-
NI, 71.76% in 2-Int-I and 74.88% in 2-Int-NI. Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the 
difference between 1-Int-I and 2-Int-I is highly significant (p=0.005), while the difference 
                                                          
dictator game when there is uncertainty for the recipient on whether his earnings result on the sender’s decision. 
26 Donations above TS8000 disappear in 1-Int-I while they represent 10% of the donations in 1-Int-NI; similarly, 
they represent 1.67% in 2-Int-I instead of 8.34% in 2-Int-NI.  
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between 1-Int-NI and 2-Int-NI fails significance by a little (p=0.115). Transparency reduces 
embezzlement, but not significantly so (p=0.121 when comparing 1-Int-NI and 1-Int-I and 
p=0.701 when comparing 2-Int-NI and 2-Int-I).  
However, these aggregate results may hide contrasted differences at the individual level.  
Next, we explore the individual determinants of embezzlement, summarized in Result 4. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean total percentage of the amount donated by the sender that is embezzled by 
intermediaries, by treatment 
 
Result 4 (Intermediaries’ embezzlement, individual level) a) The percentage embezzled is 
smaller when the chain is longer because first intermediaries embezzle less than intermediaries 
in short chains. b) Transparency tends to reduce embezzlement except for the first intermediaries 
in long chains.  
 
Support for Result 4. Table 2 indicates that when there is no transparency the mean percentage 
of the amount received from the previous player (either the sender or the first intermediary) that 
is embezzled by an intermediary is lower in a long chain (48.49% in 2-Int-NI) than in a short 
chain (62.04% in 1-Int-NI; p=0.085).27 This is driven by the specific behavior of the first 
intermediaries. Indeed, when there is no transparency the first intermediaries embezzle 
significantly less than single intermediaries in short chains (39.79% vs. 62.04; p=0.014), while 
the second intermediaries embezzle more than the first ones (60.69%; p=0.053) and as much as 
                                                          
27 Importantly, these percentages indicate that intermediaries transfer a much higher share of the amount received 
than senders. This confirms that intermediaries did not play as in a simple dictator game and that they understood 
that their role is to transfer money to the recipients. 
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the single ones (p=0.818). This finding holds for different levels of donations, as shown in Figure 
3 that displays the embezzlement percentage for three categories of amount received (1000, 2000 
and 3000, 4000 and more).28 The first intermediaries’ behavior contradicts the replacement logic 
according to which an individual becomes more likely to steal if he expects that if he does not 
do it himself, somebody else will do it anyway. Instead of relaxing the cost of deviating from the 
moral ideal of honesty because of the opportunity to share shame with the next intermediary, 
first intermediaries behave as if they were trying to compensate for the anticipated dishonesty of 
others. This result is consistent with our prediction P5 based on the assumption that for the first 
intermediaries the marginal social utility of the transfer decreases with the expected transfer of 
the second intermediary (i.e. 𝑓12 < 0).  
 
Figure 3. Mean percentage of the amount received embezzled, by category of amount 
received, treatment and rank 
Note: The number on each bar corresponds to the number of observations. The percentages are 
conditional on receiving a positive amount to transfer. 
 
Introducing transparency in short chains decreases the mean percentage embezzled from 
62.04% in 1-Int-NI to 50.55% in 1-Int-I but the difference fails significance (p=0.122). Figure 3 
shows that this is mainly observed for donations below TS4000: observability generates a higher 
                                                          
28 This division is arbitrary but guarantees a sufficient number of observations in each cell.  
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moral cost when the initial donation was already small. We do not see the same pattern in long 
chains where the mean percentage embezzled is 47.97% in 2-Int-I, which differs neither from 
48.49% in 2-Int-NI (p=0.995), nor from 50.55% in 1-Int-I (p=0.876). This hides, however, 
different dynamics for the first and the second intermediaries. Indeed, the second intermediaries 
tend to embezzle less (52.14% instead of 60.69%; p=0.575), like single intermediaries in short 
chains (p=0.662). In contrast, the first intermediaries embezzle slightly more (44.78% instead of 
39.79%, p=0.485). None of these effects are statistically significant, though. As a result, with 
transparency the difference of position in the chain is no longer significant (p=0.412).  
The previous analysis is based on means but some effects can be seen at corners. The share 
of intermediaries who transfer the integrality of the amount received is smaller in short chains 
(26.67%) than in long chains (38.51%) (proportion test: p=0.055). On the opposite corner, the 
share of players who embezzle fully decreases significantly with transparency (from 37.31% 
without transparency to 28.46% with transparency; proportion test, p=0.063).  
We next turn to a regression analysis. Table 5 reports estimates on the determinants of 
intermediaries’ individual decisions broken into three panels. The first panel presents Probit 
models explaining full dishonesty: the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the intermediary 
embezzles the totality of the amount received, and 0 otherwise. The second panel explores the 
opposite corner and presents Probit models explaining full honesty: the dependent variable is 
equal to 1 if the intermediary transfers the totality of the amount received, and 0 otherwise. The 
last panel reports on Tobit models in which the dependent variable is the percentage embezzled. 
Each panel reports the marginal effects from three regressions, one pooling the data of all 
treatments, one restricted to the short chains and one restricted to the long chains. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the matched group level.  
The independent variables include the amount received, the experimental location and 
demographic controls. The regressions on pooled data add dummies for the size of the chain and 
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for the absence of transparency. Those on long chains also include a dummy indicating whether 
the subject is the first intermediary and a variable interacting this dummy with the 2-Int-NI 
treatment to capture a potential rank-specific effect of the absence of transparency. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the percentage of the amount received embezzled by each intermediary 
 Probability of being fully dishonest  
(Probit) 
Probability of being fully honest  
(Probit) 
Percentage of the amount received embezzled 
(Tobit) 
All chains 
(1) 
Short chains 
(2) 
Long chains 
(3) 
All chains 
(4) 
Short chains 
(5) 
Long chains 
(6) 
All chains 
(7) 
Short chains 
(8) 
Long chains 
(9) 
Long chain 
 
No transparency 
 
1-Int-I treatment 
1-Int-NI treatment 
 
2-Int-I treatment 
 
2-Int-NI treatment 
 
Amount received 
 
1st intermediary 
 
1st intermediary 
*2-Int-NI treatment 
Dar-es-Salaam 
 
Male 
 
Age 
 
Married 
 
Christian 
 
Religious practice 
-0.091 
(0.067) 
0.129** 
(0.060) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
 
- 
 
 
0.266*** 
(0.055) 
0.136** 
(0.063) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
0.136 
(0.195) 
-0.128# 
(0.079) 
-0.025 
(0.027) 
- 
 
- 
 
Ref. 
0.247** 
(0.109) 
- 
 
- 
 
<-0.001* 
(<0.001) 
- 
 
- 
 
0.480*** 
(0.099) 
0.071 
(0.135) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
0.428# 
(0.261) 
-0.390*** 
(0.144) 
-0.081* 
(0.046) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
Ref. 
 
0.167# 
(0.102) 
<-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.135 
(0.108) 
0.001 
(0.142) 
0.190*** 
(0.070) 
0.213*** 
(0.076) 
-0.018 
(0.014) 
-0.068 
(0.182) 
0.015 
(0.091) 
0.010 
(0.035) 
0.139** 
(0.061) 
-0.011 
(0.060) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<0.001 
(<0.001) 
 
 
 
 
-0.223*** 
(0.057) 
-0.209*** 
(0.072) 
0.027** 
(0.011) 
-0.131 
(0.120) 
0.096 
(0.076) 
0.044 
(0.030) 
- 
 
- 
 
Ref. 
-0.057 
(0.097) 
- 
 
- 
 
<0.001 
(<0.001) 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.187** 
(0.086) 
-0.231* 
(0.128) 
0.052*** 
(0.019) 
-0.281*** 
(0.057) 
-0.048 
(0.037) 
0.123*** 
(0.044) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
Ref. 
 
-0.199* 
(0.113) 
<-0.001 
(<0.001) 
-0.070 
(0.122) 
0.320** 
(0.155) 
-0.286*** 
(0.071) 
-0.262*** 
(0.091) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.286 
(0.201) 
0.172* 
(0.090) 
0.005 
(0.042) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
- 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
<-0.001** 
(<0.001) 
- 
 
- 
 
0.049*** 
(0.012) 
0.036*** 
(0.013) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.023 
(0.025) 
-0.023 
(0.014) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
- 
 
- 
 
Ref. 
0.049* 
(0.030) 
- 
 
- 
 
<-0.001 
(<0.001) 
- 
 
- 
 
0.112*** 
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.033) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
0.139*** 
(0.037) 
-0.047 
(0.037) 
-0.036*** 
(0.014) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
Ref. 
 
0.032# 
(0.019) 
<-0.001*** 
(<0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.029 
(0.025) 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
0.045*** 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.035 
(0.353) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
Number of obs. 
Log pseudo-likelih. 
Left/right cens. obs. 
261 
-143.867 
- 
90 
-39.96 
- 
171 
-92.161 
- 
261 
-150.418 
- 
90 
-42.160 
- 
171 
-99.028 
- 
261 
-264.227 
90/87 
90 
-79.794 
24/31 
171 
-171.994 
66/56 
Notes: Table 5 reports marginal effects from Probit models ((1) to (6)) and Tobit models ((7) to (9)). Robust standard errors are clustered at the matched group level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
level, respectively. # indicates significance at the 0.11 level. 
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First, Table 5 confirms that the probability of being fully honest is 13.9 points higher (model 
(4)) in long chains than in short chains and that the percentage embezzled by an intermediary is 
significantly smaller (model (7)). Thus, if at the aggregate level a longer transfer chain increases 
the total percentage embezzled (Result 3), this result is driven mainly by a mechanical effect.  
Second, the probability of being fully dishonest increases by 12.9 points when there is no 
transparency (model (1)). This effect is stronger in short chains (model (2)) than in long chains 
(model (3)). In short chains without transparency, the probability of being fully dishonest 
increases by 24.7% (model (2)) and the percentage embezzled by 4.9% (model (8)): 
embezzlement reacts to variations in its moral cost. We do not find such a global effect in long 
chains (see models (3) and (9)). However, while the first intermediary is 32% more likely to be 
fully honest than the second intermediary in the absence of information (which confirms P5), 
transparency eliminates the difference between the two intermediaries (model (6)). Indeed, 
transparency increases by 19.9% the second intermediary’s probability of being fully honest 
while it reduces this probability for the first intermediary by 12.1%. The disciplining effect of 
transparency works also in long chains, but at the upper margin; in contrast to short chains, it is 
null on the lower margin (see model (3)). Our model helps interpreting these findings. The direct 
effect of transparency increases the moral cost of behaving dishonestly because of (individual or 
shared) shame, and this motivates intermediaries to reduce embezzlement regardless of the length 
of the chain and on the position in the chain. However, transparency has an ambiguous impact 
on the first intermediaries, as stated in prediction P6. Indeed, its direct effect can be traded-off 
by its indirect effect through higher expectations about the honesty of the second intermediaries 
induced by transparency. Expecting less embezzlement from the second intermediary because of 
transparency reduces the disutility of deviating from their moral ideal and lead them to behave 
less honestly. This can explain that they are no more honest than the second intermediaries under 
transparency. 
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Third, Table 5 reveals that when the amount received is larger, intermediaries are less likely 
to be fully dishonest and they embezzle a lower percentage of the donation. There are two 
interpretations. Previous literature has shown that people do not lie in full because they want to 
keep a positive self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013). When observing that previous players in the chain have been more generous, full 
dishonesty probably makes it more difficult for people to keep a good image of themselves.29 A 
second interpretation is the existence of an income target: if the donation is more generous, they 
take a lower percentage of it. Our design does not allow us to disentangle between these two 
interpretations. Finally, Table 5 confirms the existence of weaker norms in Dar-es-Salaam: 
subjects there are more likely to be fully dishonest, less likely to be fully honest and they 
embezzle a higher percentage of the donation. The same applies to males in long chains whereas 
a more frequent religious practice reduces embezzlement in short chains.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Embezzlement is a major issue. We have developed an original model and conducted an 
experiment to investigate whether the organization of the transfer chain and transparency on 
donations can discourage embezzlement and motivate higher donations. Our experiment 
corroborates most of our theoretical predictions. A key finding is that the recipients’ final 
earnings are lower in the presence of intermediaries, especially when intermediaries are more 
numerous and recipients are not informed about the amount donated by the senders.  
A first explanation lies in the fact that senders are less generous when their transfer cannot 
be made directly, revealing the expectation of embezzlement especially in long chains. More 
surprisingly, senders react negatively to transparency. An interpretation is that transparency 
makes the possibility of embezzlement more salient to them, which reduces the moral cost of 
                                                          
29 This result is unlikely driven by the intermediaries’ willingness to equalize their payoff with that of the recipients. 
Indeed, conditional on receiving at last TS3000, only 11.76% of the intermediaries transfer 3000 (which would 
equalize the recipient’s payoff and the initial endowment of the intermediary). More generally, there are only 13 
observations out of 360 in which the final payoff of the recipient is equal to that of the intermediary. 
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deviating from their moral ideal of generosity. A second explanation lies in the mechanical effect 
of the length of the transfer chain. The higher total percentage embezzled in long chains is due 
to the fact that more intermediaries are in a position to take money. This is not driven by a higher 
percentage taken by each link in the chain permitted by the fact that each one can hide behind 
the other. Indeed, when there is no transparency, the first intermediaries embezzle less than the 
second ones. They are more likely to refrain from taking money when they expect more 
embezzlement in the chain. This care for the recipients’ welfare contradicts the replacement logic 
and the idea that more links reduce the sense of responsibility. Our model with reference-
dependent preferences in terms of moral ideal explains that the direct effect of transparency 
increases the moral cost of embezzlement because of shame, whereas its indirect effect plays in 
the opposite direction for the first intermediaries who anticipate that transparency will reduce 
embezzlement by the following intermediary. 
The fact that individuals, belonging to the same subject-pool and assigned randomly to a 
role, show different preferences depending on their position in the transfer chain is quite 
remarkable. Senders express concerns for the implicit price of their donation while intermediaries 
express concerns for the situation of their potential victim. Expecting dishonesty from the next 
players reduces the loss aversion from deviating from one’s moral ideal for the senders but 
increases it for the intermediaries at the beginning of the chain. An interpretation is that the 
reference point differs between senders and intermediaries: senders decide in the loss domain 
(accepting a reduction of earnings to get closer to the moral ideal) while intermediaries decide in 
the gain domain (accepting not to increase earnings to get closer to the moral ideal). 
Heterogeneity is also transversal to the roles. While some intermediaries resist the temptation 
and that others embezzle everything, embezzlement is most of the time incomplete even in the 
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absence of sanctions.30 This extends the previous literature on heterogeneity of attitudes towards 
dishonesty (Gibson et al., 2013) by showing that the latter also depend on the expectations about 
others’ moral firmness, since the position in the chain makes a difference. 
In terms of policy, our results suggest that shortening the transfer chain would improve the 
welfare of recipients. The advantages of transparency depend on how the chain is organized. 
Incidentally, we suggest that in long chains interventions should target the final link instead of 
the first ones. It is also important to pay attention to how information is communicated to avoid 
that transparency makes dishonesty more salient and reduce the willingness to donate. 
Of course, we need to be careful regarding the extrapolation of our findings. We 
acknowledge some limitations that suggest a number of extensions. It would be interesting to 
study how repeated interactions affect embezzlement and to explore higher degrees of 
transparency. Allowing intermediaries to observe the (dis)honesty of the previous individuals in 
the chain would enable us to study whether or not peer effects, if any, are symmetric. While our 
experiment is based on a zero-sum game, it might be interesting to introduce negative 
externalities of embezzlement. Other manipulations include variations in the organization of the 
transfer chain (for example, introducing elected intermediaries or varying the intermediaries’ 
relative income). It might be also interesting to replicate this study in other countries to better 
appreciate the role of these norms. This is left for further investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 This is consistent with the theory of maintenance of self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013; Shalvi et al., 2011) which explains that most people are willing to cheat to earn more but they do not 
exploit their cheating opportunities in full in order to keep a good image of themselves.  
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Instructions for the 1-Int-NI treatment  
(The differences with the 1-Int-I treatment are indicated in italics) 
 
We thank you for your participation in this experiment on decision-making. During this experiment, you will be able 
to earn Tanzanian Shillings (TS) in cash. Your decisions or responses to questions will be strictly anonymous and 
confidential. You will be identified only by an id code throughout the experiment. 
In this experiment we randomly form groups of three people. Each group consists of one person A, one person B 
and one person C. The identity of the other group members will remain anonymous throughout the experiment. 
After reading the instructions, each of you will be randomly assigned to one of three different rooms that correspond 
to the three different roles. Once in the room, all the participants in this room will be assigned the same role. This 
means that all the participants A will be in the same room; all the participants B will be in another room and all the 
participants C will be in a third room. Once in your room, you will learn your role and you will never meet again 
the participants in the other roles. 
 
The task 
At the beginning of the experiment in each group, person A receives 15 000 TS. Person B receives 5 000 TS. Person 
C receives 2 000 TS. 
Person A has to decide how many TS to transfer to person C. Person A can choose any amount between 0 and 15 
000 TS, as multiples of 1 000 TS (either 0, 1000, 2000, …., 15 000).  
If person A sends money to person C, the transfer has to be done through an intermediary, person B. The role of 
person B is to transfer the money to person C. Person B is not allowed to transfer his own TS to person C.  
Person C has no decision to make.  
 
If you are a person A 
You will receive a bag marked with the id number of your group of three. This bag contains two envelopes, white 
and brown.  
 The white envelope contains 15 000 TS.  
 The brown envelope is empty and you can use it to transfer money to person C. 
You have to decide how many TS you transfer to person C through person B. You can transfer 0, 1 000, 2 000, ... 
up to 15 000 TS.  
Please use the bag to count your notes in the white envelope and to place discreetly the TS you want to transfer in 
the brown envelope.  
The amount of TS that you leave in the white envelope is for you to take home. Keep the white envelope for yourself. 
Leave the brown envelope in the bag. 
An assistant will collect the bags containing the brown envelope and give them to another assistant who will bring 
the bags to the room of persons B.  There, the person B you are matched with will receive your bag marked with the 
id number of your group and containing the brown envelope.  
Then you will receive instructions for the next task to complete before being allowed to leave the room. 
 
If you are a person B 
You will receive from the person A you are matched with a bag marked with the id number of your group of three. 
This bag contains two envelopes, white and brown.  
 The white envelope contains 5 000 TS for you to take home.  
 The brown envelope contains the TS that the person A you are matched with wants you to transfer to the 
person C in your group. 
Please use the bag to count discreetly the notes in the white envelope and in the brown envelope.  
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After counting, you have to decide how many TS to leave in the brown envelope. You are not allowed to add any of 
your TS in the brown envelope. Keep the white envelope for yourself. Leave the brown envelope in the bag. 
An assistant will collect the bags containing the brown envelope and give them to another assistant who will bring 
the bags to the room of persons C.  There, the person C you are matched with will receive the bag marked with the 
id number of your group and containing the brown envelope.  
Then you will receive instructions for the next task to complete before being allowed to leave the room. 
 
If you are a person C 
You will receive instructions for a task to complete.  
Then, you will receive a bag marked with the id number of your group of three. This bag contains two envelopes, 
white and brown.  
 The white envelope contains 2 000 TS.  
 The brown envelope contains the TS that the person B you are matched with transferred to you on behalf 
of person A. Person B cannot transfer any of his own TS to you. 
The amount of TS in the white and the brown envelopes is for you to take home. Keep these envelopes for yourself. 
Leave the bag. 
Then you will be allowed to leave the room. 
Information 
Person A does not know how many TS the person B has left in the brown envelope that was received by person C. 
Person C does not know how many TS the person A has put in the brown envelope that was received by person B.  
This paragraph has been replaced with the following in the 1-Int-I treatment: 
Person A does not know how many TS the person B has left in the brown envelope that was received by person C. 
Person C knows how many TS the person A has put in the brown envelope that was received by person B. 
------ 
If you have any question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you and answer your questions 
in private. 
From now until the end of the experiment, it is strictly forbidden to talk, otherwise you will be excluded from the 
session and earnings.  
------ 
Instructions for the 2-Int-NI treatment  
(The differences with the 2-Int-I treatment are indicated in italics) 
 
We thank you for your participation in this experiment on decision-making. During this experiment, you will be able 
to earn Tanzanian Shillings (TS) in cash. Your decisions or responses to questions will be strictly anonymous and 
confidential. You will be identified only by an id code throughout the experiment. 
In this experiment we randomly form groups of four people. Each group consists of one person A, one person B1, 
one person B2, and one person C. The identity of the other group members will remain anonymous throughout the 
experiment. 
After reading the instructions, each of you will be randomly assigned to one of four different rooms that correspond 
to the four different roles. Once in the room, all the participants in this room will be assigned the same role. This 
means that all the participants A will be in the same room; all the participants B1 will be in another room; all the 
participants B2 will be in a third room and all the participants C will be in a fourth room. Once in your room, you 
will learn your role and you will never meet again the participants in the other roles. 
The task 
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At the beginning of the experiment in each group, person A receives 15 000 TS. Person B1 and person B2 each 
receive 5 000 TS. Person C receives 2 000 TS. 
Person A has to decide how many TS to transfer to person C. Person A can choose any amount between 0 and 15 
000 TS, as multiples of 1 000 TS (either 0, 1000, 2000, …., 15 000).  
 
If person A sends money to person C, the transfer has to be done through two successive intermediaries, person B1 
and person B2. The role of persons B1 and B2 is to transfer the money to person C. Persons B are not allowed to 
transfer their own TS to person C. 
 
Person C has no decision to make.  
 
If you are a person A 
You will receive a bag marked with the id number of your group of four. This bag contains two envelopes, white 
and brown.  
 The white envelope contains 15 000 TS.  
 The brown envelope is empty and you can use it to transfer money to person C. 
You have to decide how many TS you transfer to person C through person B. You can transfer 0, 1 000, 2 000, ... 
up to 15 000 TS.  
Please use the bag to count your notes in the white envelope and to place discreetly the TS you want to transfer in 
the brown envelope.  
The amount of TS that you leave in the white envelope is for you to take home. Keep the white envelope for yourself. 
Leave the brown envelope in the bag. 
An assistant will collect the bags containing the brown envelope and give them to another assistant who will bring 
the bags to the room of persons B1.  There, the person B1 you are matched with will receive your bag marked with 
the id number of your group and containing the brown envelope.  
 
Then you will receive instructions for the next task to complete before being allowed to leave the room. 
 
If you are a person B1 
You will receive from the person A you are matched with a bag marked with the id number of your group of four. a 
bag marked with the id number of your group of three. This bag contains two envelopes, white and brown.  
 The white envelope contains 5 000 TS for you to take home.  
 The brown envelope contains the TS that the person A you are matched with wants you to transfer to the 
person C in your group through person B2. 
Please use the bag to count discreetly the notes in the white envelope and in the brown envelope.  
After counting, you have to decide how many TS to leave in the brown envelope. You are not allowed to add any of 
your TS in the brown envelope. Keep the white envelope for yourself. Leave the brown envelope in the bag. 
An assistant will collect the bags containing the brown envelope and give them to another assistant who will bring 
the bags to the room of persons B2.  There, the person B2 you are matched with will receive the bag marked with 
the id number of your group and containing the brown envelope.  
 
Then you will receive instructions for the next task to complete before being allowed to leave the room. 
 
If you are a person B2 
You will receive from the person A and the person B1 you are matched with a bag marked with the id number of 
your group of four. This bag contains two envelopes, white and brown.  
 The white envelope contains 5 000 TS for you to take home.  
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 The brown envelope contains the TS that the person A you are matched with wants you to transfer to the 
person C in your group and that person B1 has left. 
Please use the bag to count discreetly the notes in the white envelope and in the brown envelope.  
After counting, you have to decide how many TS to leave in the brown envelope. You are not allowed to add any of 
your TS in the brown envelope. Keep the white envelope for yourself. Leave the brown envelope in the bag. 
An assistant will collect the bags containing the brown envelope and give them to another assistant who will bring 
the bags to the room of persons C.  There, the person C you are matched with will receive the bag marked with the 
id number of your group and containing the brown envelope.  
 
Then you will receive instructions for the next task to complete before being allowed to leave the room. 
 
If you are a person C 
You will receive instructions for a task to complete.  
Then, you will receive a bag marked with the id number of your group of four. This bag contains two envelopes, 
white and brown.  
 The white envelope contains 2 000 TS.  
 The brown envelope contains the TS that the person B1 and the person B2 you are matched with transferred 
to you on behalf of person A. Persons B1 and B2 cannot transfer any of their own TS to you. 
The amount of TS in the white and the brown envelopes is for you to take home. Keep these envelopes for yourself. 
Leave the bag. 
Then you will be allowed to leave the room. 
Information 
Person A does not know how many TS the person B1 and then the person B2 have left in the brown envelope that 
was received by person C. 
Person B2 does not know how many TS the person B1 received from person A. 
Person C does not know how many TS the person A has put in the brown envelope that was received by person B1 
and then by person B2.  
This paragraph has been replaced with the following in the 2-Int-I treatment: 
Person A does not know how many TS the person B1 and then the person B2 have left in the brown envelope that 
was received by person C. 
Person B2 does not know how many TS the person B1 received from person A. 
Person C knows how many TS the person A has put in the brown envelope that was received by person B1 and then 
by person B2. 
------ 
If you have any question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you and answer your questions 
in private. From now until the end of the experiment, it is strictly forbidden to talk, otherwise you will be excluded 
from the session and earnings.  
------ 
 
Final instructions common to all treatments 
(These instructions were distributed in rooms A and B after the bags have been collected. They were distributed in 
room C before the bags were distributed) 
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Please fill out the questionnaire that has been distributed to you. We remind you that all your responses are 
anonymous. Do not forget to mention your experimental id number at the top of this questionnaire. You receive 2 
000 TS for answering this questionnaire. 
Finally, you have an opportunity to earn extra money by tossing the coin that has been put on your table. 
You can toss the coin as many times as you like, but you have to report only the first toss. Please toss the coin as 
discreetly as possible. 
 If the first toss of the coin shows Head, you earn 2 000 TS that will be added to your other payoffs. 
 If the first toss of the coin shows Tail, you earn nothing in this task. 
Please report at the end of the questionnaire form the outcome of your first coin toss.  
------- 
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Appendix 2. The experimental settings 
  
Experimental locations: Dar-es-Salaam and Mazimbu 
 
  
An experimental room 
 
 
The bags used to transfer money and make decisions 
 
  
Mazimbu 
 
Dar es-Salaam 
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Appendix 3. Details on the model 
We provide in this Appendix an extended version of the model which is, more or less, self-contained. The 
propositions presented in the main document are reproduced here, with the same numbering, but in a more precise 
way. We consider a fixed size population consisting of a sender (player 0) and n intermediaries (player 1 to player 
n), indexed by i, who interact in a modified sequential dictator game. The utility function is the same for all the 
players, and defined by: 
𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝑢((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) + 𝑓(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃).                                        (1) 
In order to simplify the notation we let 𝑈, 𝑢, and 𝑓 instead of, respectively, 𝑈𝑖, 𝑢𝑖, and 𝑓𝑖. The function 𝑢 represents 
the player’s material utility, and 𝑓 her moral utility. 𝑟𝑖 is the amount received by player i from the previous player 
in the game, except for the sender who receives an exogenous amount, normalized to r0 = 1. Player i chooses the 
fraction 𝜎𝑖  ∈ [0,1] of the amount received she transfers to the next player in the chain. The penultieme player 
transfers money to an ultimate player, called the recipient. By definition 𝑟𝑖  ∈ [0,1] for all 𝑖 = 0,1, … , 𝑛 but, because 
we are interested in player i’s behavior, we also assume that she receives a strictly positive amount, so that 𝑟𝑖  ∈
(0,1]. 
We assume that player i has beliefs on the fractions 𝜎𝑗 the players after her in the chain will transfer to the 
next player (𝑗 = 𝑖 + 1, … , 𝑛). We denote by 𝜎𝑗(𝜃) player i’s expected transfer by player j under information 𝜃 ∈
{0,1}, and by ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) = ∏ 𝜎𝑗(𝜃)
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1  the total fraction of her own transfer that player i expects the recipient will 
receive. Therefore (1 − ?̅?𝑖(𝜃)) is player i’s expected level of relative embezzlement after her in the chain, under 
information 𝜃. For the last intermediary in the chain, namely player n, we necessarily have ?̅?𝑛(𝜃) = 1. In a standard 
dictator game, we have ?̅?0(𝜃) = 1. 
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Hypothesis 1. 𝑢1 > 0 and  𝑢11 < 0. 
Hypothesis 2. There exists ?̂?𝑖 ∈ [0,1] such 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , . , . ) > 0  for all 𝜎𝑖 < ?̂?𝑖, and 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , . , . ) ≤ 0   for all 𝜎𝑖 > ?̂?𝑖. 
Moreover 𝑓11 ≤ 0. 
 
Examples of utility functions 
Because 𝑓 captures player i’s moral concern, we can reasonably assume that f is weakly increasing in its second 
argument (𝑓2 ≥ 0) or, equivalently, weakly decreasing in the expected total relative embezzlement after her in the 
chain (1 − ?̅?𝑖(𝜃)). We emphasize that this assumption is not required for our results, but the examples of functions 
f  below are consistent with it. The following examples are also consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Example 1: 𝑓(𝜎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 0. 
In example 1 the player has no moral concern. Indeed, a necessary condition for consistency with hypothesis 2 is 
that ?̂?𝑖 = 0, a moral ideal which corresponds to no transfer. The solution of the player’s utility maximization is, 
under hypothesis 1, trivial: She transfers nothing. 
Example 2: 𝑓(𝜎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝛾𝜎𝑖, with 𝛾 > 0. 
In example 2, 𝑓 captures a kind of impure altruism or honesty, in the sense that the player is only concerned by the 
fraction she transfers, regardless of the amount received by the recipient at the end. In that case, one has 𝑓1 > 0, 
                                                          
31 In this context, we can write 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , 𝜃) = 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , 1, 𝜃) and 𝑓(𝜎𝑖 , 𝜃) = 𝑓(𝜎𝑖 , 1, 𝜃), so that the utility is reduced 
to the expression e 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , 𝜃) = 𝑢((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) + 𝑓(𝜎𝑖 , 𝜃).  
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𝑓2 = 0 and, for consistency with hypothesis 2, ?̂?𝑖 = 1. The more the player transfers, the higher her moral 
satisfaction. Hence, an arbitrage is required here in choosing the value of 𝜎𝑖. On the one hand, 𝜎𝑖 decreases the utility 
𝑢 of her final payoff. On the other hand, 𝜎𝑖 increases her utility resulting from her moral concern, captured by 𝑓. 
Example 3: 𝑓(𝜎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝛾𝜎𝑖?̅?𝑖(𝜃), with 𝛾 > 0. 
In example 3, the player is concerned by the final expected amount 𝜎𝑖?̅?𝑖(𝜃) of her own transfer received by the 
recipient, according to her beliefs on the intermediaries’ transfers after her in the chain. Notice that 𝑓1 > 0 and 𝑓2 >
0, so that moral satisfaction increases with 𝜎𝑖, but also with ?̅?𝑖(𝜃). Hence, expecting more embezzlement after her 
in the chain – recalling that it is equal to (1 − ?̅?𝑖(𝜃)) – reduces her moral satisfaction. In that case, it is possible that 
the player transfers more in order to compensate for embezzlement. 
Example 4: 𝑓(𝜎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = −𝛾(?̂?𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖)
2, with ?̂?𝑖 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛾 > 0. 
In example 4, the player is characterized by a moral ideal ?̂?𝑖, so that any deviation of 𝜎𝑖 from this ideal (which works 
as a moral reference point) will decrease the utility resulting from her moral concern. We have 𝑓1 > 0 for all 𝜎𝑖 < ?̂?𝑖 
and 𝑓1 < 0 for all 𝜎𝑖 > ?̂?𝑖, and 𝑓2 = 0. As in example 1, the player is only concerned by the fraction she transfers – 
or the deviation from her moral ideal – and not by the amount received by the recipient. 
Example 5: 𝑓(𝜎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝛾1?̅?𝑖(𝜃) − 𝛾2(?̂?𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖)
2, with ?̂?𝑖 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛾1, 𝛾2 > 0. 
Example 5 is such that 𝑓1 > 0 for all 𝜎𝑖 < ?̂?𝑖 and 𝑓1 < 0 for all 𝜎𝑖 > ?̂?𝑖 and, contrary to the previous case, 𝑓2 > 0. 
We notice that the quadratic term which captures the deviation cost (or moral cost) is independent on ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) here. 
Example 6: 𝑓(𝜎𝑖, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝛾1?̅?𝑖(𝜃) − 𝛾2?̅?𝑖(𝜃)(?̂?𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖)
2, with ?̂?𝑖 ∈ [0,1] and 𝛾1 ≥ 𝛾2 > 0. 
Example 6 is comparable to the previous one, but captures two effects: Deviating from the moral ideal ?̂?𝑖 reduces 
the player’s moral satisfaction, but the cost is smaller as ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) is small – or equivalently as the expected total relative 
embezzlement after her in the chain (1 − ?̅?𝑖(𝜃)) is high. We have 𝑓1 > 0 for all 𝜎𝑖 < ?̂?𝑖 and 𝑓1 < 0 for all 𝜎𝑖 > ?̂?𝑖, 
and 𝑓2 = 𝛾1 − 𝛾2(?̂?𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖)
2 because 𝛾1 ≥ 𝛾2 > 0 and (?̂?𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖)
2 ∈ [0,1]. We emphasize that, contrary to all the 
previous cases (despite example 3), the cross derivatives 𝑓12 and 𝑓21 are non-zero here. 
Example 7: 𝑓(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = −𝛾1𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜎𝑖?̅?𝑖(𝜃) − (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖; 0} − 𝛾2𝑚𝑎𝑥{(1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖 − 𝜎𝑖?̅?𝑖(𝜃); 0}, 
with 𝛾1 ≥ 𝛾2 > 0.. 
In example 7, the utility 𝑈 we obtained is quite similar to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s utility function where 𝛾1 
[resp. 𝛾2] is, in their terminology, the parameter of disadvantageous [resp. advantageous] inequality aversion. Notice 
that the player only compares her monetary payoff (1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖  to the one she expects the recipient will obtain, namely 
𝜎𝑖?̅?𝑖(𝜃). The only difference with the Fehr and Schmidt’s model is that the utility u resulting from the monetary 
payoff is strictly concave here, whereas it is linear in the Fehr and Schmidt’s model. This utility function is 
rationalisable in our model by assuming that ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖 (𝑟𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖(𝜃))⁄ , which corresponds to the fraction player i has to 
transfer in order to equalize her own payoff to the one she expects the recipient will obtain. 
Notice that, in all the previous examples, we considered that the direct effect of information is null, or 
equivalently letting 𝑓3 = 0. We do not provide examples here with 𝑓3 ≠ 0. Propositions 1.a and 1.b are detailed 
versions of proposition 1 in the main text. 
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Proposition 1.a. Assume that the player’s preferences can be represented by the utility function in equation (1), and 
assume that hypotheses 1 and 2 are satisfied. Moreover, let ?̂?𝑖 ∈ [0,1] be the player’s moral ideal. Then, there exists 
a unique donation 𝜎𝑖 that maximizes the player’s preferences, denoted 𝜎𝑖
∗, which is such that 𝜎𝑖
∗ ∈ [0, ?̂?𝑖]. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.a. Let 𝜃 ∈ {0,1}, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) ∈ [0,1] and ?̂?𝑖 ∈ [0,1] be fixed, and assume that hypotheses 1 and 
2 are satisfied. First notice that 𝑈1(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = −𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) + 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) and that 
𝑈11(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝑟𝑖
2𝑢11((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) + 𝑓11(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃). Uniqueness of a maximum 𝜎𝑖
∗ results from the fact 
that 𝑈11 < 0 because 𝑢11 < 0 and 𝑓11 ≤ 0, together with 𝑟𝑖 ∈ (0,1] by definition. Then, the first order condition for 
the maximization of 𝑈, according to 𝜎𝑖, yields:  
𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗)𝑟𝑖) ≥ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃),  if 𝜎𝑖
∗ = 0, 
𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗)𝑟𝑖) = 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃),  if 𝜎𝑖
∗ ∈ (0,1),         (2) 
𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗)𝑟𝑖) ≤ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃),  if 𝜎𝑖
∗ = 1. 
We have to prove that, if ?̂?𝑖 ∈ [0,1], then 𝜎𝑖
∗ ≤ ?̂?𝑖. Let us prove this assertion by contradiction. Assume that 𝜎𝑖
∗ > ?̂?𝑖. 
From hypothesis 2, we have 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗, . , . ) ≤ 0. Because 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗)𝑟𝑖) > 0 by hypothesis 1 (𝑢1 > 0) and the fact 
that 𝑟𝑖 ∈ (0,1], the only possibility by the first order condition in equation (2) is 𝜎𝑖
∗ = 0. Since 𝜎𝑖
∗ > ?̂?𝑖 by 
assumption, we necessarily have ?̂?𝑖 ∉ [0,1], which is impossible. ∎ 
 
Proposition 1.a establishes that the player will never transfer more than her moral ideal. If we observe that a player 
transfers a strictly positive amount, we can deduce from our model that her moral ideal is greater than the amount 
sent. Notice that, on the basis of proposition 1.a, ?̂?𝑖 > 0 is a necessary condition for a non-zero transfer (clearly if 
?̂?𝑖 = 0, then 𝜎𝑖
∗ = 0), but this condition is not sufficient. We identify in proposition 1.b a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the player to transfer a non-zero amount. 
 
Proposition 1.b. Assume that the player’s preferences can be represented by the utility function in equation (1), and 
assume that hypotheses 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then the following two statements are equivalent: 
(a) The unique transfer 𝜎𝑖
∗ i that maximizes the player’s preferences is not zero. 
(b) 𝑟𝑖𝑢1(𝑟𝑖) < 𝑓1(0, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.b. Let 𝜃 ∈ {0,1} and ?̅?𝑖(𝜃) ∈ [0,1] be fixed. The existence and uniqueness of a maximum 
𝜎𝑖
∗ results from proposition 1.a. 
(b) ⇒ (a). By statement (b) we have 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) < 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) when 𝜎𝑖 = 0. From the first order condition 
in equation (2), 𝜎𝑖
∗ cannot be zero. Equivalently, 𝜎𝑖
∗  is such that 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗)𝑟𝑖) ≤ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃), so that 𝜎𝑖
∗ ∈
(0,1]. 
(a) ⇒ (b). By assuming statement (a), there exists 𝜎𝑖
∗ ∈ (0,1] such that 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗)𝑟𝑖) = 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) if 
𝜎𝑖
∗ ∈ (0,1), and 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗)𝑟𝑖) ≤ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) if 𝜎𝑖
∗ = 1. From hypotheses 1 and 2, 𝑢11 < 0 and 𝑓11 ≤ 0. 
Hence for a given 𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) strictly decreases as 𝜎𝑖 decreases, and 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) weakly increases as 𝜎𝑖 
decreases. Thus, we have 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) < 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) for all 𝜎𝑖 < 𝜎𝑖
∗. Such a 𝜎𝑖 exists because 𝜎𝑖
∗ > 0. 
Hence 𝑟𝑖𝑢1(𝑟𝑖) < 𝑓1(0, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃). ∎ 
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According to proposition 1.b, the player makes a strictly positive transfer if and only if she has a minimal 
moral concern. Indeed, according to statement (b) which can also be written 𝑈1(0, 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(𝜃), 𝜃) > 0, if the player 
choose 𝜎𝑖 = 0, then an infinitesimal transfer strictly increases his utility 𝑈. In other terms, the marginal utility loss 
due to a diminution of the monetary payoff is more than compensated by the marginal increase in the moral utility 
𝑓. This is the meaning of minimal moral concern in our model. If statement (b) is not true, then the unique transfer 
that maximizes the player’s preferences is 𝜎𝑖
∗ = 0. 
Notice that the previous result is true regardless of the player’s beliefs about the transfers of the 
intermediaries after her in the chain. If she anticipates that they will transfer nothing (?̅?𝑖(𝜃) = 0), then the player 
transfers a positive amount if and only if 𝑟𝑖𝑢1(𝑟𝑖) < 𝑓1(0,0, 𝜃). This last condition can be true, for instance, if she 
has an intrinsic motivation to give that is independent of the amount finally obtained by the recipient, such as warm-
glow giving (as in example 2). 
 
Proposition 2. Assume that the player’s preferences can be represented by the utility function in equation (1) and 
assume that hypotheses 1 and 2 are satisfied. Moreover, let 𝜎𝑖
∗0 and 𝜎𝑖
∗1  denote the transfers that maximize, 
respectively, the utilities 𝑈(𝜎𝑖, 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) and 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃) with ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃)  ∈  [0,1], such that at least 
one of the two optimal transfers,  𝜎𝑖
∗0 and 𝜎𝑖
∗1, is an interior solution. The following two statements are equivalent: 
(a) For all ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃)  ∈  [0,1], if  ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃) ≤  ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃) then 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1 . 
(b) 𝑓12 ≥ 0. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 𝜃 ∈ {0,1} is an exogenous parameter and thus it is fixed. First notice that if at least one of 
the two optimal transfers 𝜎𝑖
∗0 and 𝜎𝑖
∗1  is an interior solution we have, equivalently, (𝜎𝑖
∗0, 𝜎𝑖
∗1) ≠ (0,0) and 
(𝜎𝑖
∗0, 𝜎𝑖
∗1) ≠ (1,1). 
(b) ⇒ (a). Let 0 ≤ ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃) ≤  ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃) ≤ 1 and assume that statement (b) is true. Moreover, assume that hypotheses 
1 and 2 are satisfied. If 𝜎𝑖
∗ = 1 then, by definition we have 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1 and statement (a) is true. If 𝜎𝑖
∗1 ∈ [0,1), 
then we have: 
        𝑟𝑖𝑢1 ((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗1)𝑟𝑖) ≥ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃) ≥ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃).                                     (3) 
The first inequality results from the first order condition of maximization as presented in equation (2), because 𝜎𝑖
∗1 ∈
[0,1). The second inequality is a consequence of statement (b). Hence we have 𝑟𝑖𝑢1 ((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗1)𝑟𝑖) ≥
𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃), where 𝜎𝑖
∗1 is probably not the value that maximizes 𝑈(. , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃). Moreover, 𝑢11 < 0 and 
𝑓11 ≤ 0 by hypotheses 1 and 2 so that, with 𝑟𝑖 ∈ (0,1] fixed, 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) strictly decreases as 𝜎𝑖 decreases, and 
𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) weakly increases as 𝜎𝑖 decreases. We deduce that the optimal amount transferred under the 
expected intermediaries’ transfer ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), denoted by 𝜎𝑖
∗0, is such that 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1. 
(a) ⇒ (b). Assume that statement (a) is true, so that 0 ≤ ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃) ≤  ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃) ≤ 1 and 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1. If 𝜎𝑖
∗0 = 𝜎𝑖
∗1, 
recalling that (𝜎𝑖
∗0, 𝜎𝑖
∗1) ≠ (0,0) and (𝜎𝑖
∗0, 𝜎𝑖
∗1) ≠ (1,1) by assumption, we have: 
             𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗0, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) = 𝑢1(1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗0) = 𝑢1(1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗1) = 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃).                              (4) 
The first and third equalities result from the first order condition in equation (2).We deduce that 𝑓1(𝑥, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) =
𝑓1(𝑥, ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃) for all 𝑥 ∈ (0,1). Now, if 𝜎𝑖
∗0 < 𝜎𝑖
∗1 we have: 
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            𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) ≤ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗0, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) ≤ 𝑢1(1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗0) < 𝑢1(1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗1) ≤ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃).          (5) 
The first inequality is a consequence of 𝑓11 ≤ 0. The second inequality results from the first order condition in 
equation (2), by noting that 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ∈ [0,1) because 𝜎𝑖
∗0 < 𝜎𝑖
∗1 ≤ 1. The third inequality follows from 𝑢11 < 0. The 
last inequality results from the first order condition in equation (2), by noting that 𝜎𝑖
∗1 ∈ (0,1] because 
0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗0 < 𝜎𝑖
∗1 . We deduce that  𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) ≤ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃). By applying the same reasoning, we 
also have  𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗0, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) ≤ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗0, ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃). By combining the two possible cases 𝜎𝑖
∗0 = 𝜎𝑖
∗1 and 
𝜎𝑖
∗0 < 𝜎𝑖
∗1 we conclude that, if 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1, then we necessarily have 𝑓1(𝑥, ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃), 𝜃) ≤ 𝑓1(𝑥, ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃), 𝜃) for all 
𝑥 ∈ [0,1]. ∎ 
 
Proposition 2 actually demonstrates only one case among the three mentioned in the same Proposition in 
the main text. But the two other cases are direct corollaries. This result identifies the restriction to be placed on the 
utility function in order to guarantee that an increase in the anticipated embezzlement – from state 1 to state 0 in the 
Proposition, represented by the relation ?̅?𝑖
0(𝜃) ≤  ?̅?𝑖
1(𝜃) – reduces the player’s optimal transfer. It is worth 
emphasizing that the restriction only concerns function 𝑓. 
 
Proposition 3. Assume that the player’s preferences can be represented by the utility function in equation (1) and 
assume that hypotheses 1 and 2 are satisfied. Moreover, assume that transparency has no impact on the anticipated 
embezzlement or, equivalently, ?̅?𝑖(𝜃
0) = ?̅?𝑖(𝜃
1) =  ?̅?𝑖 for all 𝜃
0, 𝜃1 ∈ {0,1}. Now let 𝜎𝑖
∗0 and 𝜎𝑖
∗1 denote the 
transfers that maximize, respectively, the utilities 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖 , 𝜃
0) and 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖 , 𝜃
1) with 𝜃0, 𝜃1 ∈ {0,1}, such that 
at least one of the two optimal transfers, 𝜎𝑖
∗0 and 𝜎𝑖
∗1, is an interior solution. The following two statements are 
equivalent: 
(a) For all 𝜃0, 𝜃1 ∈ {0,1}, if 𝜃0 ≤  𝜃1, then 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1. 
(b) 𝑓1(. , . ,0) ≤  𝑓1(. , . ,1). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that, if we had defined information as a continuous parameter, so that 𝜃 ∈ [0,1], then 
statement (b) would have to be replaced by the condition 𝑓13 ≥ 0. The proof here uses exactly the same arguments 
as the ones used in the proof of proposition 2. ∎ 
Proposition 3 investigates the direct effect of information/transparency on the optimal transfer, by 
controlling the indirect effect which can play a role through the player’s beliefs about the transfer of all the players 
after her in the chain. In that case, the player’s optimal transfer weakly increases with transparency – from 𝜃 = 0 to 
𝜃 = 1 – if and only if the marginal moral utility of the transfer, also weakly increases with transparency.  
 
Hypothesis 3. ?̅?𝑖(0) ≤ ?̅?𝑖(1). 
Hypothesis 4. 𝑓1(. , . ,0) ≤  𝑓1(. , . ,1). 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that a player anticipates that transparency cannot increase embezzlement of all the 
intermediaries after her in the chain. Hypothesis 4 is equivalent to assume that the direct effect of information is 
such that a player does not transfer less under transparency (see proposition 3). 
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Proposition 4. Assume that the player’s preferences can be represented by the utility function in equation (1) and 
assume that hypotheses 1 to 4 are satisfied. Moreover, let 𝜎𝑖
∗0 and 𝜎𝑖
∗1 denote the transfers that maximize, 
respectively, the utilities 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(0), 0) and 𝑈(𝜎𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(1), 1). If 𝑓12 ≥ 0, then 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1. If 𝑓12 < 0, then the 
ranking between 𝜎𝑖
∗0 and 𝜎𝑖
∗1 is ambiguous. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. Assume that hypotheses 1 to 4 are satisfied. If 𝜎𝑖
∗1 = 1, then by definition 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1. If 
𝜎𝑖
∗1 ∈ [0,1), then we have:  
𝑟𝑖𝑢1 ((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗1)𝑟𝑖) ≥ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖(1), 1) ≥ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖(1), 0) ≥ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖(0), 0).                (6) 
The first inequality results from the first order condition of maximization as presented in equation (2), because 𝜎𝑖
∗1 ∈
[0,1). The second inequality is a consequence of hypothesis 4. If, in addition, we assume that 𝑓12 ≥ 0, then the third 
inequality follows from hypothesis 3. One obtains 𝑟𝑖𝑢1 ((1 − 𝜎𝑖
∗1)𝑟𝑖) ≥ 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖
∗1, ?̅?𝑖(0), 0), where 𝜎𝑖
∗1 is probably 
not the value that maximizes 𝑈(. , 𝑟𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(0), 0). Moreover, 𝑢11 < 0 and 𝑓11 ≤ 0 by hypotheses 1 and 2 so that, with 
𝑟𝑖 ∈ (0,1] fixed, 𝑟𝑖𝑢1((1 − 𝜎𝑖)𝑟𝑖) strictly decreases as 𝜎𝑖 decreases, and 𝑓1(𝜎𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖(0), 0) weakly increases as 𝜎𝑖 
decreases. We deduce that the optimal amount transferred under 𝜃 = 0, denoted by 𝜎𝑖
∗0, is such that 𝜎𝑖
∗0 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
∗1. 
To conclude the proof note that, if 𝑓12 < 0, then the sign of the third inequality in equation (6) is reversed, so that 
the effect of transparency on the player’s optimal transfer is ambiguous. ∎ 
 
By assuming that transparency cannot increase anticipated embezzlement after the player in the chain 
(hypothesis 3), and assuming that the direct effect of transparency affects positively the optimal transfer (hypothesis 
4), Proposition 4 identifies the role of the cross-derivative 𝑓12 on the optimal transfer. It follows that the player’s 
does not decrease her transfer under transparency if 𝑓12 ≥ 0. Otherwise, the impact of information is ambiguous. 
We emphasize that, for the last player in the chain, only the direct effect of information impacts her transfer decision. 
In that case, under hypothesis 4, the optimal transfer of this last player does not decrease with transparency (see 
proposition 3). 
Finally, we investigate the impact of the number of intermediaries on the player’s behavior. We can 
reasonably assume that total embezzlement, expected by the player after her in the chain, does not decrease with the 
number of intermediaries. More precisely, if ?̅?𝑖
𝑛(𝜃) = ∏ 𝜎𝑗(𝜃)
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+1  denotes the total fraction of the player’s 
transfer she expects that the recipient will obtain after the chain of the n intermediaries, we assume the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5. ?̅?𝑖
𝑛+1(𝜃) ≤  ?̅?𝑖
𝑛(𝜃). 
For instance, hypothesis 5 is true if the player anticipates a similar (relative) transfer for each intermediary (𝜎𝑗 =
𝑐 ∈ [0,1] for all 𝑗 = 𝑖 + 1, … , 𝑛, so that ?̅?𝑖
𝑛+1(𝜃) = 𝑐?̅?𝑖
𝑛(𝜃) ≤  ?̅?𝑖
𝑛(𝜃)). As a corollary of proposition 2, we also 
obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 5. Assume that the player’s preferences can be represented by the utility function in equation (1) and 
assume that hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 are satisfied. The player’s optimal transfer is not lower [resp. is not higher, resp. 
is equal] with a short intermediaries’ chain after her, as compared to a long chain, if and only if 𝑓12 ≥ 0 [resp. 
𝑓12 ≤ 0, resp. 𝑓12 = 0]. 
